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1. Introduction 
How feminine is corporate America? Are there really as few women in executive positions as 
is often claimed, and how has the situation been changing over the last few years? Do glass 
ceilings1 that prevent women from achieving highest positions exist? Do firms with female 
executives systematically differ from male-dominated corporations? And what about money, do 
the level and structure of executive compensation differ between men and women? Are different 
incentive schemes used to motivate women than men? 
 These and other questions are at the heart of an ongoing discussion about the situation of 
women in executive positions in companies. Although women are still very rare at the top 
executive level, there is some evidence that the glass ceiling is finally cracking. As Catalyst, a 
New York-based research nonprofit research and advisory organization working to advance 
women in business, reports in its 2002 Census, 15.7% of corporate officers in the Fortune 500 are 
women, up from 12.5% in 2000. However, there were only 6 female CEOs in the F500 in 2002.2  
While these issues are commonly discussed in the popular business press,3 relatively few 
academic papers systematically investigate them. Bertrand and Hallock (2001), for instance, 
study the gender compensation gap among high-level executives in US corporations over the 
period 1992 to 1997, finding that women have nearly tripled their participation in top executive 
ranks as well as strongly improved their relative compensation.  
Hallock (2002) examines the gender wage gap among managers of nonprofit organizations 
using newly collected data on compensation of managers and accounting characteristics of US 
nonprofit organizations. He finds significant differences between women and men with respect to 
both compensation and characteristics of firms they work for.  
Bartlett and Miller (1985) investigate the influences of networking and human capital 
investments by examining a sample of top female executives in the US during the 1980s. They 
conclude that networking is as important as performance variables in helping women to climb the 
corporate ladder.  
                                                 
1If glass ceilings existed, they would allow people to see through to the world above them. Because glass is transparent, those 
working under such a ceiling might not, at first, even notice that there was a barrier separating them from higher levels. Yet if 
they tried to pass through it, they would quickly learn that the ceiling prevented any such rise. This analogy is often used to 
describe the situation of women and minorities, who are alledgedly kept from achieving any but token positions at the highest 
echelons of corporate America. For further information see also 
http://home.earthlink.net/~rdmadden/webdocs/Shattering_the_Glass_Ceili.html. 
2 For further information see http://www.catalystwomen.org. 
3 See, e.g., The Economist July 16th 1998, Jill-in-a-box; Survey: Women and Work. 
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The aims of this paper are as follows: First, it provides an up-to-date overview of the 
distribution of women in top executive positions of US corporations. Second, it attempts to 
identify significant differences between firms managed by women and those managed by men. 
Third, it addresses the issue of executive compensation and investigates whether structure and 
level of executive pay differ significantly between women and men. 
To a certain extent the paper complements that of Bertrand and Hallock (2001). It differs, 
however, in that it uses data up to 2001. Recent data seem particularly important for these kinds 
of studies given that changes might have occurred over the last few years. In addition, we not 
only consider the importance of firm size, but also other firm characteristics, e.g., growth, 
profitability, capital intensity, leverage, which may be related to the distribution of women in top 
executive positions.4 As a further new aspect, we look at Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and  
all executives separately. This sample split turns out to provide additional insights into some 
questions. Finally, we provide a detailed analysis of the structure of executive compensation by 
considering strength of incentive measures with respect to the gender dimension. As far as we 
know, this has not been done so far.  
Our data are taken from the Compustat Executive database, which reports on the top five 
executives by firm, for the years 1992 to 2001. We have a total of 54’380 observations from 
2’489 firms.  Our results suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity in the distribution of 
female executives across industries. Women executives tend to work for smaller, but faster 
growing and also more profitable firms. Furthermore, women are paid less on average, compared 
with their male colleagues in executive positions. However, this pay difference is much smaller 
for CEOs than for executives in general. Finally, we find differences with respect to the structure 
of compensation in the sense that female CEOs receive more variable compensation and also 
hold more shares of the firms they are working for.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 discusses the 
distribution of women in top executive positions across industries and over time. Section 4 
investigates whether the existence of female executives in a company is related to firm-specific 
characteristics. The question of compensation differences between male and female executives in 
terms of level and structure is explored in section 5. Section 6 draws conclusions.  
                                                 
4 As Bartlett and Miller (1985) note, the executive compensation literature tends to focus on firm size and profitability rather than  
other company characteristics. 
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2. Data  
Our main data source is the Compustat Executive Compensation database. We have 
compensation data from the top five executives for each firm for the years 1992 to 2001. The 
data on executives contain various firm- and person-specific information. For certain analyses we 
split the sample into Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and All Executives since there are 
significant differences between these executive categories especially with respect to role of 
women. The sample contains all firms in the Compustat database. We retain those observations 
for which the gender of the executives is known and where we have non-missing information on 
the main compensation measures as defined in section 5. Overall, we have a total of 54’380 
observations from 2’489 firms. We combine the data on executive compensation with financial 
statement information taken from the Compustat Industrial Annual database. All the data are 
reported in thousands of  2001 dollars adjusted using the consumer price index. 
3. How widespread are female executives? 
A first look at the data shows that female executives form a clear minority. Table 1 shows  
the absolute and relative number of women in top executive positions. On average, there are 
3.77% female executives in our sample, and the proportion of female CEOs is as low as 1.16%.  
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
From Figure 1, which shows the percentage of female executives over the years, we see a 
clear positive trend.5 However, this mainly holds for the category All executives, whose share 
increased from 1.92 % in 1992 to 6.5 % in 2001, and much less for CEOs, for which the share of 
women increased from 0.62 % in 1992 to 1.58 % 2001. As we will see later on, larger firms are 
less likely to employ women as top executives. Given that our sample comprises only listed 
firms, which are also larger on average, it is obvious that this as well as the other findings are not 
representative for all US corporations.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Let us finally look at the distribution of female executives across industries, shown in 
Table 2. There is a considerable heterogeneity across industries. Female executives are most 
widespread in the Wholesale and Retail Trade and Information industries, but also in Food, 
Tobacco and Textile Manufacturing as well in Health Care and Social Assistance. If we focus on 
                                                 
5 From regressing the share of female executive against time we obtain a highly significant, positive time trend for all both  
categories. 
 4
CEOs only, the proportion of women is much smaller or zero for certain industries. Even though 
there are some women in executive positions, the CEO jobs are still very much a man’s domain.  
Note that these figures might be affected by company size, which is related to industry affiliation 
as well as to the share of women executives. We will investigate the role of firm size and its 
potential interaction with other characteristics in more detail in the following section.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.  Which firms are managed by women?  
The previous section gives us a preliminary picture of the distribution of female executives 
over time and across industries. To go one step further, we now ask whether firms with female 
executives have specific characteristics, beside those associated with industry classification. 
Since economic theory does not really guide us in our choice of company characteristics, we 
mainly rely on existing studies on gender issues as well as on our intuition. This results in a 
somewhat heuristic exercise, which, however, may still reveal some interesting facts.  
The following firm-specific characteristics are considered: (1) Size of firm: According to 
Bertrand and Hallock (2001), women tend to work for smaller firms. We use the number of 
employees (empl), sales (sales) and the market value of the firm (mktval) to measure the size of 
the firm.6 (2) Physical capital intensity:  We use the ratios of fixed assets per employee7 
(fix_empl) as well as fixed assets over total assets (fix). (3) Uniqueness: We measure the 
uniqueness of the firm by the ratio of research and development expenses, and advertisement 
expenditures respectively, over total assets. (4) Profitability: We use EBIT over total assets as 
well as the return on assets to arrive at an indicator for firm profitability. (5) Growth: According 
to Carter et al. (2002), growth is a strategic choice variable, which may, among others, also 
depend on the executives’ preferences. We measure growth by the q-ratio (q), which is similar to 
Tobin’s q,8 and the change in total assets from year (t-1) to year t (chg_assets). (6) Risk 
exposure: There is a stereotypical view that women avoid risky situations more than men.9 We 
                                                 
6 Bertrand and Hallock (2001), who also use total assets as a fourth measure for firm size, find that women tend to work for 
smaller firms 
7 Rajan and Wulf (2003) use this variable to measure the importance of  human capital in a firm. 
8 The q-ratio is defined as total assets plus the difference between market value and book value of equity over total assets. It is 
commonly used to measure a firm’s growth opportunities.  
9 See, e.g.,  Powell, Schubert and Gysler (2001) for further references.  
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use the ratio of long-term debt over total assets (debtr_lgt) and the volatility of stock returns10 
(volat) to measure the firm’s risk exposure.  
In a first step, we check whether the mean of these characteristics differs between women 
and men in executive positions. Besides considering all executives, we also look at the 
subsample with the CEOs only. This is simply a descriptive exercise and does not control for any 
industry or time effects or potential interactions between the characteristics which may drive 
certain relationships. Also, we say nothing about the direction of causality. Table 3 reports our 
findings. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
As we can see from Table 3, firms with female CEOs are on average smaller than those 
with a man in the top position. When looking at all executives, this relationship only holds when 
the size of the firm is measured by sales and by market value. As to the physical capital intensity, 
we find that men tend to work for more capital-intensive companies. This may to a certain extent 
reflect the distribution of women across industries, since the most capital-intensive industries 
such as Mining, Oil, Construction and Utilities have a low proportion of female executives. From 
our uniqueness measures we see that R&D intensive firms are more likely to have a man as CEO. 
Advertising intensive firms, on the other hand, do not significantly differ with respect to the 
gender of the CEO, but women are underrepresented among the top five executives.  
Women executives are at the head of more profitable firms on average, where profitability 
is measured as EBIT over total assets. This finding, however, is not confirmed when we look at 
the return on equity, for which we find no significant difference. As to growth of firms, we find 
no significant differences when looking at the CEOs only, and the findings are inconclusive 
when all executives are considered. Finally, firms with a woman as CEO are, on average, less 
leveraged, but do have a higher volatility of stock returns. These relationships are reversed when 
we consider the top five executives. These characteristics may again be related to the firm size, 
for which we found significant differences between men and women. We know from capital 
structure studies, for instance, that larger firms are more leveraged.11  
Overall, we find robust results with respect to gender of executives and firm characteristics 
for firm size, physical capital intensity, profitability as measured by EBIT over total assets, and 
                                                 
10 The volatility of stock returns is measured as the standard deviation of returns over the last 60 months as used in the Black 
Scholes formula to calculate the value of an option. 
11 See, e.g., Tittman and Wessels (1988). 
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leverage. Also, findings vary depending on whether we only look at the CEOs or whether we 
consider all executives together.  
To have a more complete picture of which firms are run by female executives and to take 
account of possible interactions between the characteristics, we estimate a logit model where we 
explain the likelihood that a company is managed by a woman by the firm characteristics 
considered above. A firm is considered as ‘woman managed’ if there is at least one woman 
among the top five executives. Accordingly, the dependent variable is the binary variable 
1+fem_exe, which is equal to one if there is at least one woman among the five top executives in 
a given year, and zero otherwise, i.e., 
Ni
riskqprofituniqfixsizeGPXYP iiiiiiii
,..,1
)()1( 654321
=
++++++=== ββββββα
 (1) 
We estimate different specifications with respect to the included explanatory variables to 
allow for the fact that alternative measures for company characteristics do not always measure 
the same feature. Also, we include industry dummies, with the chemical (and other material) 
manufacturing industries as a benchmark case, and year dummies as control variables. Robust 
standard errors are calculated according to the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance and 
are given in brackets. Table 4 provides the results.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Given the results from the logit regressions in Table 4, we observe that smaller and faster 
growing12 firms are more likely to have female executives.13 To get some idea of the strength of 
these relationships, let us consider the average firm in the sample, with a market value of 4’784 
Mio. From the first specification it follows that the log odds is -3.32. The corresponding 
probability of having at least one female executive amounts to 3.49%.14 Let us now look at a firm 
which is fifty times larger but otherwise identical. The log odds ratio with the higher market 
value is now –4.14, which yields a probability of having female executives of 1.56%. Such an  
increase in size thus makes it more than half as likely that the firm is managed by women.  
Furthermore, advertising and R&D-intensive companies, which are considered to be more 
unique, are less likely to have female executives, even though we only find significant results for 
                                                 
12 We only report the results with the q ratio as growth proxy. The results from the change in total assets chg_assets are similar. 
13 The correlation between mktval and q is 0.13. 
14 The log odds of –3-32 is obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficients by the mean values of the variables. 
The probability of having female executives is then 0349.0
)32.3(exp(1
1
=
−+
.  
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the first measure. More profitable firms are more likely to have women among their top five 
executives.15 Finally, both our risk exposure measures debtr_lgt and bs_volat do not lead to 
conclusive results.  
These results to a certain extent confirm the descriptive statistics as outlined in Table 3, 
even though they also depend on the model specification. Furthermore, the coefficients of the 
time dummies from 1993 on are significant at the 1% level in all the specifications. This reflects 
the fact that women did indeed become more numerous in top executive positions over the time 
period considered. Overall, we conclude that our explanatory variables do not explain much of 
the variation in the dependent variable, which indicates that more research is needed to achieve 
better understanding of what determines female leadership in large corporations.  
5. Compensation issues 
5.1. The level of compensation 
Do women in top executive positions earn less than their male colleagues, as is the case in 
many other professions? Following Bertrand and Hallock (2001), we look at total pay figures of 
executives (pay_tot), which consist of the following four components: (1) salary (salary) is the 
dollar value of cash and non-cash salary; (2) bonus (bonus) is the dollar value of cash and non-
cash bonus; (3) options (option) refers to the dollar value of options granted in the current period 
as valued using S&P’s Black Scholes methodology; and (4) other (other) consists of the dollar 
value of annual compensation not categorized as salary or bonus.  Figures 2.1. and 2.2. show the 
evolution of total pay over the years for CEOs as well as for all executives.16  
[Insert Figure 2.1. about here] 
[Insert Figure 2.2. about here] 
From Figures 2.1. and 2.2. it appears that the average total pay is not always higher for 
men than for women when we look at the CEOs alone, but it is the case in all the years when we 
consider all executives together. To have a more precise picture of these data, we check whether 
the mean of total pay as well as its components differ significantly between women and men. The 
statistics are given in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
As we can see from Table 5, there is indeed no significant difference in total pay between 
women and men in CEO positions. The only difference is with respect to bonus payments, which 
                                                 
15 The correlation between mktval and adv_int is –0.006 and between mktval and profit_ta  is 0.05. 
16 Bertrand and Hallock (2001) only consider all executives together and do not look at the CEOs separately. 
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are significantly higher for men. When we look at all executives, however, we find that women 
are indeed paid less than men, and this holds for all compensation components. On average, 
women executives earn 26% less than men.  
To take into account potential effects from firm size, industry affiliation, profitability and 
the age of the executive,17 we run the following regression:  
Ni
roemktvalagefemtotpay iiiiii
,..,1
)_log( 4321
=
+++++= εββββα   (2) 
where fem is a dummy variable equal to one if the executive is a woman and zero otherwise, age 
stands for the age of the executive, mktval is the market value of equity and roe refers to the 
return on equity, and ε is the error term with ε ~N(0, ). We also include time and industry 
dummies, with the chemical (and other material) manufacturing industry as the benchmark case. 
Table 6 shows the results of our OLS regressions, for CEOs as well as for all executives.  
2σ
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
As we can see from Table 6, total pay is significantly lower for women than for men, both 
for all executives and for CEOs, and after controlling for age of executive, firm size and 
profitability. Interestingly, the negative effect is much smaller for CEOs. While a female 
executive earns, on average, 44% less than her male colleagues, this difference shrinks to 22% 
when CEOs are considered alone. Consequently, the gender compensation gap is less 
accentuated for executives in CEO positions.18  
Besides these gender issues, our results also show that the older executives earn more, 
which is a well-documented fact from human capital theory. However, age, which is also 
considered as a proxy for work experience, seems to be less reflected in a higher wage for CEOs 
than for all executives. On average, a CEO is 56.23 years old, whereas female CEOs are 49.93 
and male CEOs are 56.3 years old on average. For all executives, the average age is 54.88 years, 
with 49.14 years for women and 55.04 years for men. Finally, our results show that CEO pay 
depends on firm performance, although we do not find significant results for all executives.  
                                                 
17 According to Bartlett and Miller (1985), executive pay, is, among other factors, a function of firm size and profitability. The 
inclusion of human capital variables goes back to the theory of human capital by Gary Becker . Due to unreliable or missing data 
with respect to tenure and education, we only include the executive’s age as a proxy for human capital. 
18 Unfortunately, we do not have reliable data on education and tenure of executives. The inclusion of such 
information is expected to further reduce the wage difference between women and men Bertrand and Hallock (2001) 
additionally control for education and tenure and find that the unexplained gender gap for all executives is reduced 
from 45% to less than 5%. 
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5.2. The structure of compensation 
Besides the absolute level of compensation, we are also interested in whether the structure 
of compensation, and more specifically the strength of the incentives offered, differs by gender.  
Compensation contracts are typically negotiated between executives and companies and therefore 
reflect, among others factors, the preferences of executives.19  
We consider the following strength of incentive measures:20 (1) the proportion of 
compensation that is variable (varpay), (2) the percentage of options (optsh) relative to total 
compensation, and (3) the proportion of company stock owned by the executive (shrownpc). 
While the first two measures can be computed for CEOs as well as for all executives, data on 
shareownership is available for CEOs only.  
Figures 3.1. and 3.2. show the variable compensation component, which is defined as 
(pay_tot-salary)/pay_tot and expressed in %, over the years considered. The higher the variable 
pay component, the stronger the incentives for executives. From Figure 3.1. we observe that 
women CEOs have higher variable pay in the majority of years. We also obtain a significant 
result from a two-sided means difference test. When all executives are considered, we may have 
the impression that men’s compensation is more variable. The difference over the whole period, 
however, is not significant.21 Besides gender considerations, these figures also nicely illustrate 
that the proportion of variable compensation increased over the years.22  
[Insert Figure 3.1. about here] 
[Insert Figure 3.2. about here] 
 
Stock options are typically awarded to align the executives’ incentives with those of the 
shareholders in order to reduce the agency conflict.23 They also provide incentives against short-
termism among managers. The higher the option share relative to total compensation, the more 
executives are expected to act in the interests of shareholders, and the higher is the strength of 
their incentives. The variable optsh is defined as (option/pay_tot) and again expressed in %.   
We cannot conclude from Figure 4.1. that there is a systematic difference in option awards 
between female and male CEOs, and means-difference tests confirm the absence of a significant 
                                                 
19 See Murphy (1999) for an overview of compensation practices. 
20 See, e.g. Kedia (1998). 
21 These findings are confirmed when regressing the variable pay component varpay against a constant, the dummy variable fem, 
mktval as a proxy for size and year dummies: The coefficient of fem is significant at the 5% level when looking at CEOs only, and 
not significant for all executives. 
22 Regressing varpay against time and a constant results in a highly significant time trend. 
23 See, e.g. Haugen and Senbet (1981). 
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difference. When considering all executives, we find that women obtain significantly higher 
options over the whole period. It is, however, likely that this result is driven by the higher 
distribution of options as well as female executives over recent years. To confirm this, we run a 
simple OLS regression where we explain optsh by a constant, the dummy variable fem, and 
mktval as proxy for firm size. The coefficient of fem is significant at the 1% level for all 
executives, but insignificant for the CEOs. Once we include time dummies, however, there is no 
significant gender effect anymore. Apart from these considerations, Figures 4.1. and 4.2. provide 
further evidence for the more frequent use of options for compensating executives.24 
[Insert Figure 4.1. about here] 
[Insert Figure 4.2. about here] 
Let us now look at our third strength of incentive measure, the shareownership of CEOs 
shrownpc. As we can see from Figure 5, at the beginning of the time period under consideration  
male CEOs seem to own a larger portion of the company they are working for compared with 
their female colleagues. This pattern does not persist over the years, and it even seems to be 
reversed in most recent years. From a two-sided means difference test over all the years we 
would conclude that female CEOs own more shares than men do.  
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
However, it is again difficult to draw any conclusions without taking into account other 
factors that may possibly affect executives’ shareownership. As Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
outline, ownership concentration is related to firm size. When a firm grows, managers are likely 
to have a lower share due to wealth constraints and efficient risk bearing. A second factor which 
has to be considered is the control potential of the firm, i.e., the profit potential which arises from 
effective monitoring of executives’ performance (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). The higher the 
uncertainty of the environment, the greater the gains to managerial ownership. Given that female 
leadership is correlated with these firm characteristics in our sample, it is even more important to 
take these factors into account. To do so, we run the following regression:  
1 2 3 _
1,..,
i i ishrownpc fem mktval bs volat
i N
= α +β +β +β + ε
=
i i
                                                
       (3) 
Besides the dummy variable fem, which is one if the CEO is a woman and zero otherwise, we 
include mktval as a measure of firm size and bs_volat to proxy for uncertainty of the firm 
environment in our regression. ε is the error term, with  ε ~N(0, ), and we again include time 2σ
 
24 See, e.g.,  Murphy (1999) and Conyon and Murphy (2002) for further evidence.  
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and industry dummies to control for any changes over time and across industries. Table 7 shows 
the results of our OLS regressions. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 7 confirms our previous finding that women CEOs own, on average, a higher portion 
of the company they are working for than men in the role of CEO. This relationship is not driven 
by firm size since the coefficient of fem is still significant at the 5% after including mktval in the 
regression. The coefficient of bs_volat is not significant, even though we would expect a positive 
sign.  
We also computed the pay-performance sensitivity according to Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
where the change in compensation from year (t-1) to t is regressed on the change in shareholder 
wealth over the same period. To see a potential gender effect, we also included an interaction 
term as a multiplication of the change in shareholder wealth with the dummy variable fem. We 
found no systematic difference between women and men in the CEO position, i.e., the 
significance of the lower pay-performance sensitivity for women CEOs disappeared once we 
included the firm size as a control variable.25 
6. Conclusions 
This study attempts to give an overview of the distribution of women among top executives 
in US corporations. Besides considering the share of women executives across industries, it tries 
to identify firm characteristics that are correlated with a higher share of women among top 
executives. Even though female executives, and more specifically female CEOs, are still very 
rare, our data show a clear positive trend over the time period considered.  
Our analyses concerning the level and structure of executive compensation reveal that 
women earn less than men. While this observation holds for all executives as well as for CEOs, 
the wage difference is much smaller for the latter subsample. On the other hand, female CEOs 
seem to encounter stronger incentives than their male colleagues. Not only does their 
compensation contain a higher variable share, but they also own a larger portion of the firm they 
are working for, which links their wealth more closely to the performance of the company.  
Further work is needed to obtain a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the 
distribution of female executives. It would be interesting to look not only at firms listed on stock 
markets, but also at smaller firms, where women are thought to play a more important role. It 
                                                 
25 According to Baker and Hall (1998), the pay-performance sensitivity is a function of firm size. 
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may als be fruitful to consider more information about the human capital of executives. In 
addition, it would be interesting to see whether the internal organization of firms is related to the 
proportion of female executives. Some of these aspects will be addressed in future work. 
 13
References 
Baker G.P. and B.J. Hall (1998), CEO Incentives and Firm Size. NBER Working Paper No. 
6868. 
Bartlett R.L. and T.I. Miller (1985), Executive Compensation: Female Executives and 
Networking. American Economic Review 75, 266-270. 
Bertrand M. and K. Hallock (2001),  The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs. Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 55, 3-21. 
Carter Nancy M., Candida.G. Brush, Elizabeth J. Gatewood, Patricia Greene, and Myra M. Hart 
(2002). Financing High-Growth Enterprise: Is Gender an Issue? In: Critical Junctures in 
Women's Economic Lives: A Collection of Symposium Papers  45-51. Minneapolis, The 
Center for Economic Progress. 
Conyon M.J. and K.J. Murphy (2002), Stock-Based Executive Compensation. In: J.A. McCahery 
et al. (ed.), Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity. Oxford University 
Press. 
Haugen R.A. and L.W. Senbet (1981), Resolving the agency problem of external capital through 
options. Journal of Finance 36, 629-647. 
Hallock K.F. (2002), The Gender Pay and Employment Gaps for Top Managers in U.S. 
Nonprofits. Working Paper University of Illinois.  
Jensen M.C. and K.J. Murphy (1990), Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives. 
Journal of Political Economy 90, 225-264. 
Kedia S. (1998), Product Market Competition and Top Management Compensation. Working 
Paper Harvard Business School. 
Murphy K.J. (1999), Executive Compensation. In O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (ed.), Handbook of 
Labor Economics. Amsterdam, North Holland. 
Powell M., R. Schubert and M. Gysler (2001), How to Predict Gender-Differnces in Choice 
Under Risk: A Case for the Use of Formalized Models. Working Paper Center for Economic 
Research Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. 
Rajan R.G. and J. Wulf (2003), The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing 
Nature of Corporate Hierarchies. NBER Working Paper No. 9633. 
Tittman S. and R. Wessels (1988), The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. Journal of 
Finance 43, 1-19. 
 14
Wooldridge J. M. (2003), Introductory Econometrics. A Modern Approach. Thomson South-
Western. 
 
 
 15
Figures 
Figure 1: The dissemination of female executives by category over time 
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Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. 
Figure 2.1: Total pay of CEOs by gender over the years 
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Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. All data are reported in real 
2001 thousands of dollars adjusted using the consumer price index. The sample includes those 
executives who are CEO in a current year. Pay_tot is the sum of salary, bonus, options and other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Total pay of all executives by gender over the years 
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Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. All data are reported in real 2001 
thousands of dollars adjusted using the consumer price index. The sample includes the top five 
executives in a current year. Pay_tot is the sum of salary, bonus, options and other. 
 
Figure 3.1: Variable compensation component of CEOs by gender over the years 
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Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. All data are reported in real 2001 
thousands of dollars adjusted using the consumer price index. The variable varpay is defined as 
(pay_tot-salary)/pay_tot and expressed in %, where pay_tot is the sum of salary, bonus, options and 
other. The sample includes CEOs only in a current year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Variable compensation component of all executives by gender over the years 
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Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. All data are reported in real 2001 
thousands of dollars adjusted using the consumer price index. The variable varpay is defined as 
(pay_tot-salary)/pay_tot and expressed in %, where pay_tot is the sum of salary, bonus, options and 
other. The sample includes the top five executives in a current year. 
 
Figure 4.1: Option share of CEOs by gender over the years 
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Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. All data are reported in real 2001 
thousands of dollars adjusted using the consumer price index. The variable optsh is defined as 
option/pay_tot and expressed in %, where option is the value of options granted in the current 
period and pay_tot is the sum of salary, bonus, options and other. The sample includes the CEOs in 
a current year. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Option share of all executives by gender over the years 
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Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. All data are reported in real 2001 
thousands of dollars adjusted using the consumer price index. The variable optsh is defined as 
option/pay_tot and expressed in %, where option is the value of options granted in the current 
period and pay_tot is the sum of salary, bonus, options and other. The sample includes the CEOs in 
a current year. 
 
Figure 5: Shareownership of CEOs by gender over the years 
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Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. All data are reported in real 2001 
thousands of dollars adjusted using the consumer price index. The variable shrownpc is defined as 
the percentage of shares which are owned by the current CEO.  
 
Tables 
Table 1: Women by executive category 
 
 
 
 
CEO all executives 
all (% of all) 14’387 (26.46%) 54’380 (100%) 
women 167 2’052 
share of women by category 1.16% 3.77% 
Data source: Compustat Executive Compensation; averages over the period 1992-2001. 
 
Table 2: The dissemination of female executives across 2-digit NAICS industries 
industry 
description1 
% of  
female 
CEO 
% of all  
female  
executives 
nb.of   
obs.  
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 0 1.57 255 
Mining, Oil, Construction 0 1.85 3’346 
Utilities 0.56 3.83 3’500 
Manufacturing of Food, Tobacco and 
Textile Manufacturing 
3.78 4.73 2’619 
Manufacturing of Chemicals, Concrete, 
Wood, Metal and Transportation Equipm. 
1.18 2.80 18’888 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 2.11 6.27 5’547 
Transportation and Warehousing 0 2.50 1’523 
Information 2.14 5.81 4’513 
Finance and Insurance 0.19 3.42 7’905 
Personal and Business Services 0.77 4.51 5’008 
Health Care and Social Assistance 1.87 4.70 1’000 
Miscellaneous 0 3.26 276 
Data sources: Compustat Executive Compensation and http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naics.html. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The industries are originally classified according to the North American Industry Classification NAICS.  
  
Table 3: Firm characteristics and female executives 
firm 
characteristic 
variable   all  female CEOs 
CEOs 
male  
CEOs 
p-value all
executive 
female 
executives 
male 
executives 
p-value 
size employees   
(empl) 
15.54 
(44.54) 
8.06 
(13.80) 
15.63 
(44.77) 
0.000 15.19 
(43.65) 
15.95 
(51.78) 
15.16 
(43.30) 
0.504 
     sales
(sales) 
3’127.82 
(9’316.01) 
1’779.62 
(6’401.64) 
3’143.60 
(9’343.75) 
0.007 3’151.05
(9’298.56) 
2’644.67 
(5’944.62) 
3’170.91 
(9’405.21) 
0.000 
 market value  
(mktval) 
4’612.83 
(17’981.22) 
2’420.04 
(9’397.74) 
4’638.81 
(18’057.08) 
0.003  4’783.93
(19’060.17) 
4’130.88 
(14’461.13) 
4’809.48 
(19’217.40) 
0.042 
fixed assets/ 
employees(fix_empl) 
263.89 
(762.10) 
122.62 
(264.27) 
265.68 
(766.17) 
0.000 280.58 
(812.85) 
216.98 
(614.72) 
282.89 
(819.61) 
0.000 physical  
capital 
intensity fixed assets/ 
total assets (fix) 
57.34 
(40.87) 
41.98 
(31.65) 
57.53 
40.93() 
0.000 57.09 
(40.79) 
51.13 
(35.78) 
57.33 
(40.96) 
0.000 
uniqueness R&D expenses/sales (rd_int) 23.03 
(339.65) 
5.84 
(9.54) 
23.29 
(342.20) 
0.000  22.50
(340.90) 
20.89 
(154.94) 
22.57 
(346.34) 
0.752 
 advertising exp./sales (adv_int)  5.34 
(52.94) 
5.26 
(5.41) 
5.34 
(53.52) 
0.943 6.31 
(68.59) 
4.22 
(4.48) 
6.42 
(70.50) 
0.001 
profitability    EBIT/assets
(profit_ta) 
13.03 
(12.95) 
14.61 
(10.88) 
13.01 
(12.97) 
0.063 12.66
(13.15) 
13.21 
(14.78) 
12.63 
(13.08) 
0.084 
 return on equity  
(roe) 
10.96 
(503.72) 
17.86 
(225.47) 
10.88 
(506.08) 
0.699  12.20
(498.10) 
17.09 
(293.90) 
12.01 
(504.43) 
0.459 
growth   q-ratio
(q) 
2.15 
(2.62) 
2.86 
(8.25) 
2.14 
(2.48) 
0.261 2.13 
(2.67) 
2.42 
(3.22) 
2.12 
(2.64) 
0.000 
 change in total assets 
(chg_assets) 
60.67 
(3’737.53) 
45.65 
(203.56) 
60.85 
(3’759.6) 
0.668  53.31
(3’329.54) 
30.66 
(217.41) 
54.20 
(3’393.81) 
0.133 
risk  
exposure 
long-term debt/total assets 
(debtr_lg) 
19.13 
(17.73) 
12.63 
(16.17) 
19.21 
(17.73) 
0.000 19.54 
(18.18) 
17.99 
(18.01) 
19.60 
(18.18) 
0.000 
 volatility of stock 
 returns (bs_volat) 
0.40 
(0.20) 
0.48 
(0.25) 
0.39 
(0.20) 
0.000 0.41 
(0.21) 
0.45 
(0.24) 
0.41 
(0.24) 
0.000 
Data source: Compustat Executive Compensation; means over the years 1992 to 2001. The absolute values are in mio. of 2001 $, except employees, which is in thousands.  
All the ratios are in %. Standard deviation in brackets. ; p-val. refers to the difference in sample means between males and females within each category (two-sided means difference 
test with unequal variance). The q-ratio is similar to Tobin’s q and defined as follows: total assets plus the difference between market value and book value of equity over 
total assets.  Sample sizes for CEOs in order all, female, male: empl: 13’909, 165, 13’744; sales: 14’349, 166, 14’183; mktval: 14’174, 166, 14’008; fix_empl: 12’791, 160, 12’631; 
fix: 13’022, 161, 12’861; rd_int: 6’928, 103, 6’825; adv_int: 3’158, 69, 3’089; profit_ta: 14’081, 166, 13’915; roe: 14’345, 166, 14’179; q: 14’118, 166, 13’952; chg_assets: 14’227, 
167, 14’060;  debtr_lg: 14’267, 167, 14’100; bs_volat: 13’087, 149, 12’938. Sample sizes for all executives in order all, female, male: empl: 52’608, 1’986, 50’622; sales: 54’257, 
2’047, 52’210; mktval: 53’623, 2’019, 51’604; fix_empl: 48’151, 1’833, 46’318; fix: 48’997, 1’871, 47’126; rd_int: 26’028, 1’014, 25’014; adv_int: 12’058, 645, 11’413; profit_ta: 
53’211, 2’024, 51’187; roe: 54’251, 2’048, 52’203; q: 53’374, 2’007, 51’367; chg_assets: 53’807, 2’027, 51’780;  debtr_lg: 53’926, 1’865, 37’794; bs_volat: 49’116, 1’819, 47’297. 
Table 4: Logit estimation female executives and firm characteristics 
1+fem_exe (1) (2) (3) (4) 
mtkval -0.35** 
(0.09) 
-0.29** 
(0.09) 
-0.59** 
(0.13) 
-0.59** 
(0.14) 
fix 0.002 
(0.062) 
0.17* 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
rd_int -0.01 
(0.004) 
-0.01 
(0.004) 
- - 
adv_int - - -0.14** 
(0.03) 
-0.13** 
(0.03) 
profit_ta 0.11 
(0.14) 
0.29(*) 
(0.16) 
0.41* 
(0.18) 
0.43(*) 
(0.23) 
q 0.02** 
(0.004) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
debtr_lgt 0.14 
(0.11) 
- -0.78** 
(0.13) 
- 
bs_volat - 0.65** 
(0.09) 
- -0.08 
(0.17) 
constant -3.38** 
(0.17) 
-3.84** 
(0.178) 
-3.37** 
(0.20) 
-3.46** 
(0.22) 
% correctly predicted 15 15 21 21 
Log/Likelihood Value -9’931.19 -9’090.55 -5’532.84 -5’004.34 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 
N 25’188 23’327 11’772 10’766 
Data source: Compustat Executive Compensation database over the years 1992 to 2001. The data are in $ of 2001; mktval, is 
expressed in mio x 10-5 of 2001$. Robust standard errors in brackets. Definition of variables: The dependent variable is the 
response probability P(1+fem_exe=1|x), where 1+fem_exe is equal to one if there is at least one woman among the five top 
executives in a given year, and zero else; mktval=market value of equity; fix= fixed assets/total assets; rd_int=research and 
development expenses over total sales; adv_int=advertising expenses over total sales; profit_ta= EBIT/total assets; q= total 
assets plus the difference between market value and book value of equity over total assets; debtr_lgt=long-term debt over total 
assets; bs_volat= volatility of stock returns. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
are marked with **,  *, and  (*) respectively. Time and industry dummies included. 
 
 
Table 5: Executive compensation components by gender 
    variable all  female        male  p-val.
            mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max  
CEO salary             455.80 289.32 0 3'961.17 498.85 474.75 50.71 2’705.60 455.29 286.42 0 3'961.17 0.24
 bonus             485.79 1'375.37 0 90'375.23 347.39 644.18 0 5'523.60 487.41 1'381.59 0 90'375.23 0.01
               options 2’030.95 9’966.11 0 583’837.80 2’570.27 6’830.07 0 57’460.61 2’024.62 9’997.09 0 583’837.8 0.31
             other 36.17 345.81 0 32’970.45 35.82 121.90 0 905.60 36.17 347.58 0 32’970.45 0.97
              pay_tot 3’008.71 10’320.82 0 583’837.80 3’452.33 7’474.74 143.10 65’777.92 3’003.50 10’349.68 0 583’837.80 0.44
N  14’387    167      14’220    
all               salary 320.36 224.36 0 3’961.17 268.68 205.59 0 2’705.60 322.39 224.82 0 3’961.17 0.00
exec               bonus 297.11 1’065.74 0 121’271.30 172.85 295.68 0 5’523.60 301.99 1’084.56 0 121’271.30 0.00
 options              1’099.21 5’789.93 0 583’838.80 848.15 2’762.61 0 57’460.61 1’109.05 5’876.75 0 583’837.80 0.00
             other 20.53 214.19 0 32’970.45 10.32 56.61 0 1’348.47 20.93 218.05 0 32’970.45 0.00
               pay_tot 1’737.21 6’092.93 0 583’837.80 1’299.96 2’994.30 0 65’777.92 1’754.35 6’182.27 0 583’837.80 0.00
N  54’380    2’052      52’328    
 
Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. All data are reported in real 2001 thousands of dollars adjusted using the consumer price index. All executives 
include the top five highest paid executives in each firm in the database. Variables:  salary=dollar value of cash and non-cash salary; bonus=dollar value of cash and non-cash bonus; 
options=dollar value of options granted in the current period as valued using S&P’s Black Scholes methodology; other=dollar value of annual compensation not categorized as salary 
or bonus; pay_tot=the sum of salary, bonus, options and other; p-val. refers to the difference in sample means between males and females within each row (two-sided means difference 
test with unequal variance).  
Table 6: Gender effect in compensation 
 
log(pay_tot) CEOs all executives 
fem -0.22* 
(0.11) 
-0.44** 
(0.04) 
age 0.01** 
(0.002) 
0.02** 
(0.001) 
mktval 0.02** 
(0.002) 
0.01** 
(0.001) 
roe 0.0002* 
(0.00) 
0.0002 
(0.00) 
constant 5.70** 
(0.11) 
5.32** 
(0.07) 
F 119.05** 148.97** 
R2 0.25 0.19 
N 9’296 20’071 
 
Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. All data are reported in 
real 2001 thousands of dollars adjusted using the consumer price index, except market 
value, which is in bio. of $; pay_tot is the sum of salary, bonus, options and other; fem=1 
if executive is a woman; age=age of executive, mktval=market value of equity ; 
roe=return on equity. Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients that are 
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with **,  *, and  
(*) respectively. Time and industry dummies included. 
 
 
Table 7: Shareownership of CEOs by gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
shrownpc CEOs 
fem 2.55* 
(1.18) 
mktval 0.02(*) 
(0.01) 
bs_volat -0.56 
(0.60) 
constant 7.27** 
(0.68) 
F 16.24** 
R2 0.06 
N 5’979 
Source: Compustat Executive Compensation database 1992-2001. 
All data are reported in real 2001 thousands of dollars adjusted 
using the consumer price index, except market value, which is in 
bio. of $; shrownpc is the % of shares owned by the CEO; fem=1 if 
executive is a woman and zero else; mktval=market value of 
equity; bs_volat=volatility of stock returns. Robust standard errors 
in brackets. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with **,  *, and  (*) 
respectively. Time and industry dummies included. 
 
 
 
 
 
